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In this study, I examine whether information frictions associated with changes in 
accounting policies (i.e., accounting inconsistency) impact debt contracting. I argue and provide 
evidence that firms with higher accounting inconsistency are more likely to obtain private (versus 
public) debt because private lenders are better able to mitigate information asymmetry. Additional 
analyses suggest that this result is driven by discretionary accounting changes as opposed to 
changes related to new accounting standards. Furthermore, I show that the association between 
accounting policy changes and debt placement decisions is concentrated among firms adopting 
accounting policies that are less consistent with those implemented by their industry peers. 
Consistent with the conjecture that accounting policy changes increase the information asymmetry 
between borrowers and potential lenders, I find that accounting inconsistency is associated with 
disagreement among credit rating agencies and affects the loan syndication process. Finally, I 
provide evidence that lenders adjust the credit terms (i.e., cost and amount of debt) in response to 
changes in accounting policies. Collectively, these findings add to the literature that examines the 
importance of financial reporting attributes for debt contracting. 
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Regulators and standard setters argue that accounting consistency is an important attribute 
of financial reporting because it enhances the usefulness of the financial statements.1 For example, 
the FASB’s Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 250 states “the consistent use of the 
same accounting principle from one accounting period to another enhances the utility of financial 
statements for users by facilitating analysis and understanding of comparative accounting data” 
(FASB 2018).2 Prior research suggests that changes in accounting policies lead to higher 
information asymmetry because they reduce investors’ ability to distinguish between changes in 
the firm’s underlying economic performance and changes in the accounting system that measures 
this performance (Brown 1983; Dharan and Lev 1993; Peterson, Schmardebeck, and Wilks 2015). 
Moreover, it is not clear to financial statement users whether managers adopt new accounting 
policies to improve the measurement of the firm’s economic transactions or to obfuscate a potential 
decline in the firm’s underlying performance. 
Prior studies suggest that private lenders, such as banks, are better able to mitigate 
information asymmetry than public lenders, such as bondholders, because of comparative 
advantages which include access to material nonpublic information (Fama 1985; Bhattacharya and 
Chisea 1995) and superior monitoring ability (Diamond 1984, 1991). As a result, borrowers with 
higher information asymmetry face lower adverse selection costs in the private debt market 
(Campbell and Kracaw 1980; James 1987; Bolton and Freixas 2000).  
Because accounting inconsistency increases information asymmetry between firms and 
                                                           
1 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) defines accounting consistency as “the use of the same methods 
for the same items, either from period to period within a reporting entity or in a single period across entities” (FASB 
2010). In this study, unless stated otherwise, the term “accounting consistency” refers to consistency between two 
consecutive fiscal years for a given firm.  
2 Moreover, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) highlights the importance of accounting consistency 
in promoting the confidence of market participants and in maintaining fair and efficient capital markets (SEC 2014). 
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capital market participants, in this study, I examine the association between changes in accounting 
policies and future (i.e., one-year-ahead) debt contracting outcomes. Because private lenders can 
better mitigate information frictions, relative to public lenders, I investigate whether changes in 
accounting policies impact whether firms access private or public debt markets, as well as the 
terms of the resulting debt contracts. Although private lenders can use private information to 
overcome the information asymmetries associated with accounting changes, it is not clear ex-ante 
whether accounting inconsistency impacts firms’ financing decisions because, on average, 
participants in the public debt market might not consider accounting policy changes to be relevant 
for debt contracting. Understanding how accounting inconsistency affects potential lenders is 
important because debt financing is a significant component of many firms’ capital structures and 
because firms must choose between a variety of types and sources of debt (Rauh and Sufi 2010; 
Colla, Ippolito, and Li 2013).  
To examine the association between accounting inconsistency and the choice to access the 
private or the public debt market, I follow prior literature and investigate the incremental financing 
decisions of U.S. firms (Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008; Dhaliwal, Khurana, and Pereira 2011). 
I use the measure developed by Peterson et al. (2015) to proxy for accounting inconsistency. This 
measure captures the extent to which the accounting policies implemented by a given firm vary 
from one year to the next.3 Using a sample of 8,166 bank loans and bond issuances from 1996 
through 2013, I find that firms with higher accounting inconsistency are more likely to obtain 
external financing from the private rather than the public debt market. My models include controls 
                                                           
3 Specifically, Peterson et al. (2015) rely on the vector space model to measure the textual similarity of significant 
accounting policies disclosed in the footnotes of 10-K filings. They construct a measure of accounting consistency 
that varies between 0 and 1, inclusive, with higher values indicating a more consistent application of accounting 
policies across years. My measure of accounting inconsistency (Acct_Inconsistency) equals one minus the consistency 
measure from Peterson et al. (2015). Thus, higher values of Acct_Inconsistency indicate that the firm’s accounting 
policies are less consistent in the current year relative to the preceding year. 
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for determinants of the debt placement decision identified in prior studies, including accruals 
quality (Bharath et al. 2008). Thus, the effect of accounting inconsistency is incremental to the 
effect of accruals quality. I also control for changes in the firm’s underlying business and 
transactions. Finally, the economic magnitude of the effect of accounting inconsistency on the 
borrowing decision is comparable to that of other important determinants, including asset 
tangibility, financial leverage, and default risk. 
The accounting inconsistency measure from Peterson et al. (2015) captures changes in the 
significant accounting policy disclosures from one year to the next. However, these changes could 
occur for different reasons. For example, firms could implement different accounting policies due 
to the announcement of an Accounting Standard Update (ASU) from the FASB or could decide to 
voluntarily switch to an alternative, acceptable accounting principle (e.g., an alternative revenue 
recognition method). Because standard-level accounting changes and discretionary accounting 
changes might differ in terms of their impact on a firm’s information environment, I also examine 
whether the association between accounting inconsistency and a firm’s borrowing choice varies 
with the type of accounting change. I find that firms with higher discretionary changes are more 
likely to borrow from banks (versus issuing public debt), whereas firms with higher standard-level 
changes do not appear to prefer one debt market over the other. These results are consistent with 
the view that only accounting policy changes driven by managerial discretion are associated with 
frictions in the firm’s information environment. 
According to regulators and standard setters, the benefits of accounting consistency involve 
not only the consistent implementation of accounting policies within a firm over time, but also the 
extent to which a firm adopts accounting policies that are similar to those used by its peers.4 
                                                           
4 Some firms change accounting policies to conform to policies used by their industry peers. For example, in the 
footnotes of the 10-K filed for the fiscal period ending on February, 2009, Constellation Brands discloses a change in 
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Therefore, I examine whether the association between accounting inconsistency and a firm’s debt 
placement decisions depends on the similarity of its accounting policies and those of firms 
operating in the same industry. I find that the effect of accounting changes on the likelihood of 
borrowing from a bank versus issuing bonds is concentrated among firms with accounting policies 
that are less consistent with those used by their peers. 
 Because prior studies suggest that increased comparability is associated with lower 
information processing costs (De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi 2011; Peterson et al. 2015), I test 
whether the association between accounting inconsistency and the decision to access the private 
or the public debt market varies between firms that converge to the same accounting policies used 
by their industry peers and those that diverge from the accounting policies used by their industry 
peers. I find that the positive association between accounting inconsistency and the choice to raise 
bank debt rather than public debt is driven by firms that increase their accounting dissimilarity 
with respect to their peers. 
The results presented so far are consistent with the conjecture that firms with higher 
accounting inconsistency prefer to access the private debt market as opposed to the public debt 
market because financial intermediaries such as banks are better at dealing with the information 
frictions associated with the accounting policy changes than are arm’s length lenders such as 
bondholders. I conduct two analyses to directly test this channel. First, I use a sample of bond 
issuances with credit ratings available at the offering date from both Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) and show that higher accounting inconsistency is positively associated with the 
frequency and magnitude of bond rating disagreement (i.e., split ratings). Second, using a 
                                                           
the method of inventory valuation from last in, first out (LIFO) to first in, first out (FIFO), and highlights the improved 
financial comparability as a primary reason for the change. Specifically, the firm states that “the FIFO method of 
accounting will provide improved financial comparability to other publicly-traded companies in the industry”. The 
10-K filing is available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/16918/0000016918-99-000008-index.html. 
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subsample of syndicated loans, I provide some evidence that accounting inconsistency, and in 
particular, the portion related to discretionary accounting changes, affects the loan syndication 
process as well as the structure of the loan syndicate. Collectively, these findings suggest that 
accounting inconsistency affects the information asymmetry between the parties involved in the 
debt contracting process. 
In additional analyses, I examine whether accounting inconsistency is associated with ex-
ante debt contract terms (i.e., the cost and the amount of debt). The results suggest that firms with 
higher accounting inconsistency pay higher interest spreads in the public market markets, and face 
credit rationing in both markets. Furthermore, I investigate whether firms with higher accounting 
inconsistency are also more likely to raise non-bank private debt relative to public debt. Using a 
sample of private placements, I find evidence consistent with the view that firms implementing 
inconsistent accounting policies prefer both bank and non-bank private debt over public debt. 
This study provides several contributions to the literature. Prior research shows that 
accounting quality (Bharath et al. 2008), disclosure quality (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), and financial 
statement complexity (Chakraborty, Leone, Minutti-Meza, and Phillips 2018) are associated with 
the source of debt financing and the design of debt contracts. In a review of the literature on the 
role of accounting information in debt contracting, Armstrong, Guay, and Weber (2010, p.227) 
state “we currently know comparatively little about which attributes of the accounting system are 
most valuable to lenders” and they call for more research on the characteristics of the financial 
reporting process that are relevant for capital providers. This study answers Amstrong et al.’s call 
by documenting a relation between accounting consistency and firms’ debt outcomes.   
Moreover, to the extent that accounting consistency reflects the combination of several 
accounting choices that a firm makes for a given fiscal period, this study also answers a call from 
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Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) for additional research on the economic implications of accounting 
choices. Although several studies investigate the consequences of accounting choices for the 
equity market (e.g., Ball 1972; Harrison 1977; Brown 1983; Dharan and Lev 1993), the literature 
on debt-related outcomes is somewhat sparse.5 This study adds to this stream of the literature by 
examining how accounting policy changes affect debt contracting. 
Finally, because it provides some evidence on how accounting inconsistency between a 
firm and its industry peers mediates the relation between accounting inconsistency and debt 
placement decisions, my study also complements prior research examining the benefits of financial 
statement comparability across peer firms (e.g., De Franco et al. 2011; Kim, Kraft, and Ryan 2013; 
Choi, Choi, Myers, and Ziebart 2019). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature 
and develops my hypothesis. Section 3 details the sample composition, explains the construction 
of the main variables, and outlines the research design. Section 4 presents the main results, and 
Section 5 discusses some additional analyses. Section 6 provides robustness tests. Section 7 
concludes. 
  
                                                           
5 Harrison and Grudnitski (1987) and Beatty, Ramesh, and Webber (2002) are notable exceptions. The former study 
shows that income-increasing discretionary accounting changes are associated with negative reactions from 
bondholders, and the latter study finds that firms pay higher interest rates when debt contracts allow them flexibility 
to change their accounting policies. 
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2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Prior Literature  
This study examines the relation between accounting inconsistency and firms’ decision to 
access the private or the public debt market. In other words, it investigates the extent to which the 
inconsistent implementation of accounting policies for a given firm from one fiscal period to the 
next is associated with debt contracting. Therefore, it is related to the stream of the literature on 
changes in accounting policies. Early studies provide descriptive evidence on the types of 
accounting changes and the magnitude of their effect on net income (Archibald 1967; Cushing 
1969; Frishkoff 1970). These studies indicate that income-increasing accounting changes are more 
frequent than those that reduce earnings.  
To better understand the motivation underlying these decisions, researchers investigate the 
determinants of changes in accounting policies. Gosman (1973) finds a positive association 
between firm size and accounting changes, and Bremser (1975) shows that firms with poor 
economic performance are more likely to make accounting changes. Other firm characteristics that 
have been examined by prior studies include industry association, the presence of extraordinary 
items and long-term stock return (Warren 1977; Lilien, Mellman, and Pastena 1988). 
Positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986) posits that the use of 
accounting information enhances contracting efficiency, and thus suggests that certain contracts 
(e.g., compensation contracts, debt contracts) might help to explain firm’s accounting choices. For 
example, the existence of compensation contracts with bonus payments determined by the 
achievement of some benchmarks could provide an incentive for managers to choose certain 
accounting policies in an opportunistic manner. While prior research suggests that managers adopt 
accounting changes to smooth income (Moses 1987; Elliott and Philbrick 1990), most studies do 
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not find support for the hypothesis that compensation contracts explain voluntary accounting 
changes (Holthausen 1981; Hunt 1985). A possible explanation for this finding is that the 
accounting policies examined in those studies (e.g., changes in the depreciation method and 
inventory valuation) do not have a significant effect on executive compensation (Abdel-Khalik 
1985; Healy, Kang, and Palepu 1987). 
Similarly, the presence of accounting covenants in debt contracts is also considered a 
determinant of accounting choices since managers of firms approaching covenant violations have 
incentives to make income-increasing accounting changes to avoid the costs associated with 
adverse credit events (e.g., technical default, renegotiations). Several studies find evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms implement income increasing accounting changes to 
avoid costly debt covenant violations (Sweeney 1994; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 1994).6 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
Prior research shows that accounting inconsistency has a negative effect on firms’ 
information environment. For example, Peterson et al. (2015) investigate the association between 
accounting consistency and information asymmetry. Their findings suggest that lower accounting 
consistency reduces investors’ ability to distinguish between changes in the firm’s underlying 
economic performance and changes in the accounting system that measures this performance. 
Similarly, evidence from studies examining the properties of analysts’ forecasts suggest that 
changes in accounting policies are negatively associated with the quality of a firm’s information 
environment. Specifically, Brown (1983) finds that analysts issue forecasts with lower accuracy 
in the year following voluntary actuarial changes for pensions. Using a sample of mandatory and 
voluntary accounting changes, Wang (2018) shows that both types of changes are negatively 
                                                           
6 A notable exception is Holthausen (1981). His findings suggest that the presence of debt covenants is not associated 
with firm’s decision to switch from the accelerated to the straight-line depreciation method. 
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associated with analysts’ forecast accuracy and positively associated with forecast dispersion. 
Collectively, these findings are consistent with the view that accounting inconsistency reduces the 
ability of market participants to estimate future performance using public information, thus 
increasing the uncertainty about the timing and amount of firms’ future cash flows. 
A large body of theoretical and empirical work examines capital structure decisions (i.e., 
the choice between issuing debt or equity) (Frank and Goyal 2009).7 Debt is an important source 
of capital for U.S. firms and they often use different types of debt in their capital structure. For 
example, in 2017, U.S. firms issued $1,798 billion of bonds and obtained $2,410 billion from 
syndicated loans, while the amount of new equity raised in the same period was $143 billion 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2018; Thomson Reuter’s Loan Pricing 
Corporation (LPC)). As a result, recent empirical studies investigate the determinants of debt 
structure (Rauh and Sufi 2010; Colla et al. 2013).  
Information asymmetry between firms and capital providers affects corporate financing 
decisions (Myers and Majluf 1984) and the existence of significant institutional differences across 
types of debt market participants helps to explain this result. Specifically, prior theoretical research 
posits that, in the presence of asymmetric information, private lenders are better able to evaluate 
borrowers than other potential lenders (e.g., arm’s length lenders such as bondholders). Their 
comparative advantages include access to material nonpublic information related to the borrowers 
(Fama 1985; Bhattacharya and Chiesa 1995), superior information production and processing 
ability (Campbell and Kracaw 1980; Boyd and Prescott 1986), and greater incentives to effectively 
                                                           
7 Please see Graham and Leary (2011) for a comprehensive review of the literature on capital structure. 
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monitor borrowers ex post (Diamond 1984, 1991).8, 9 As a result, ceteris paribus, borrowers with 
poor information environment are expected to face lower adverse selection costs when borrowing 
from private lenders, which enables them to obtain better contracting terms relative to arm’s length 
financing (James 1987).10   
Prior research shows that accounting information plays an important role in debt 
contracting (Armstrong et al. 2010; Christensen, Nikolaev, and Wittenberg-Moerman 2016). For 
example, Bharath et al. (2008) investigate whether firms’ accounting quality (measured using 
discretionary accruals) affect their choice to access the private or the public market and the design 
of the debt contracts. Consistent with the view that banks are better equipped to deal with 
information asymmetries between the contracting parties, they find that firms with higher 
discretionary accruals are more likely to borrow privately than to issue bonds. Similarly, I posit 
that the inconsistent implementation of accounting policies affects the information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders and influences firms’ borrowing decisions (i.e., choice of debt 
source). Specifically, I argue that private lenders are better able to mitigate information frictions 
associated with accounting inconsistency due to the institutional differences that exist between 
them and public lenders. Thus, my hypothesis, stated in the alternative form is: 
                                                           
8 Unlike public lenders, private lenders are not subject to the disclosure restrictions imposed by Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (FD). Therefore, they have access to managers and they might obtain material nonpublic information from 
borrowers. 
9 Recent empirical work identify specific mechanisms trough which private lenders use such competitive advantages. 
For example, Carrisoza and Ryan (2017) show that some covenants in private debt contracts require borrowers to 
provide lenders with projected financial statements for future periods and monthly historical financial statements (i.e., 
accounting-related nonpublic information). Furthermore, Minnis and Sutherland (2017) provide evidence that banks 
use alternative information sources (e.g., tax returns) to improve loan monitoring. 
10 Importantly, Rajan (1992) argues that, under certain conditions, the informational advantage of banks over other 
lenders might lead them to extract rents from the borrowers, which would represent an additional cost for this type of 
credit. However, bank financing should still be attractive to borrowers when its benefits (e.g., lower adverse selection) 
outweigh its cost (e.g., rent extraction).     
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  H1: Firms with higher accounting inconsistency are more likely to obtain private debt 




3. Research Design 
3.1. Accounting Inconsistency 
Peterson et al. (2015) develop two measures of accounting consistency based on the textual 
similarity of significant accounting policies disclosed in the footnotes of 10-K filings. First, they 
create a time series measure that captures the similarity of the accounting policies disclosed by a 
given firm in two consecutive years (e.g., year t and year t-1). Next, they construct a cross-sectional 
measure that reflects the average similarity of a firm’s accounting policy disclosures to those from 
its peers (i.e., other firms operating in the same two-digit SIC group) for a given point in time (e.g., 
year t). Because the main purpose of this study is to examine the effects of consistent use of 
accounting policies within the same firm over time on the choice between private and public debt, 
I provide a brief description of the construction of their time-series measure.11,12 
Peterson et al. (2015) use the vector space model from Salton, Wong, and Yang (1975) to 
compare the similarity between two documents.13 The measure is obtained in three steps. First, the 
authors remove stop words and stem the remaining words.14 Next, the vector space model 
identifies the unique words in a text string and converts them into a vector. Each element of the 
vector is an integer variable set equal to 1 if the word appears in the text string, and 0 if it is 
missing. Finally, the authors measure the similarity of two strings of text using the cosine of the 
angle between the two vectors. The variable ranges from 0 to 1 where a value of 0 indicates that 
the texts have no words in common, and a value of 1 reflects two identical text strings. To facilitate 
the interpretation of the coefficients, I transform their measure of accounting consistency into one 
                                                           
11 Please see Peterson et al. (2015, p. 2489 – 2490) for a more detailed explanation of the variable construction.  
12 In section 4.2, I use their cross-sectional measure to examine the extent to which the association between accounting 
inconsistency and the firm’s choice of debt depends on the level of accounting inconsistency across firms.   
13 Other studies in the accounting and finance literature that also implement this technique to measure textual similarity 
include Hoberg and Phillips (2010), Brown and Tucker (2011), and Brown, Tian, and Tucker (2018). 
14
 Examples of stop words include “and”, “the”, or “that”. Stemming involves the removal of suffixes to obtain root 
words.  
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that captures accounting inconsistency (Acct_Inconsistency) by subtracting one from it. Therefore, 
higher values of Acct_Inconsistency indicate more inconsistent accounting policies from one year 
to the next.15,16 
3.2.Baseline Model 
To investigate the relation between accounting inconsistency and the choice between 
accessing the private or the public debt market, I follow prior literature on the determinants of the 
source of debt and use the incremental borrowing approach (Denis and Mihov 2003; Bharath et al. 




, + , +  ,) 
where Privatei,t is an indicator variable set equal to one if firm i obtains a bank loan in year t, and 
zero if firm i issues a public bond in year t, and Acct_Inconsistency i,t-1 is the transformed measure 
of accounting consistency from Peterson et al. (2015) for the year t-1. A positive and significant 
coefficient on Acct_Inconsistency i,t-1 (β1) indicates that firms with higher accounting inconsistency 
are more likely to borrow from banks than to issue public bonds. 
Xi,t-1 denotes a vector of firm-level control variables that have been shown in the prior 
literature to be associated with the firm’s decision to access the private or the public debt market 
                                                           
15
 Peterson et al. (2015) conduct some tests to validate their measure of accounting consistency and the results indicate 
that it captures changes in accounting policies from one year to the next. To further alleviate concerns related to the 
construct validity of this measure, I follow Peterson et al. (2018) and conduct two additional validation tests using my 
main sample. First, I examine the association between Acct_Inconsistency and the likelihood that a firm receives a 
preferability letter from its auditor. Next, I investigate whether the auditors are more likely to include an explanatory 
paragraph related to accounting changes in the audit report for firms with higher accounting inconsistency. In both 
tests, I find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on Acct_Inconsistency which suggests that the measure 
captures the construct of accounting inconsistency. 
16 In untabulated tests, I find that my inferences are robust to the use of an alternative measure of accounting 
inconsistency (i.e., an output-based measure) developed by Wang (2018). 
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(Bharath et al. 2008; Cheng 2017).17 In particular, following Bharath et al. (2008), the list of 
covariates include firm size, market-to-book ratio, default risk, asset tangibility (i.e, the proportion 
of fixed assets to total assets), financial leverage, access to capital markets, and accruals quality. 
All variables are described in detail in Appendix A.  
Because accounting inconsistency can be related to changes in the firm’s business 
environment (e.g., new products or services, divestiture of an operating segment), I include a proxy 
for economic inconsistency to control for changes in the underlying economic transactions from 
one year to the next.18 Furthermore, I control for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity. 
Therefore, the effect of accounting inconsistency on firms’ debt placement decisions, captured by 
the coefficient β1, should be interpreted as being incremental to changes in the underlying 
economics of the firm. I also control for the quality of the firms’ information environment (i.e., 
number of analysts following) and their financial reporting complexity (Chakraborty et al. 2018). 
Finally, in all model specifications, I include industry and year fixed effects, and cluster standard 
errors by firm. 
3.3. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
To examine the association between accounting inconsistency and firms’ choice between 
raising private or public debt, I follow Bharath et al. (2008) and construct a sample of bank loans 
and bonds issued by U.S. firms. I obtain bank loan data from Thomson Reuters’ Loan Pricing 
Corporation (LPC) Dealscan, which offers information related to loan pricing as well as other 
contract terms (e.g., issue date, amount, maturity, collateral). Thomson Reuters collects the data 
from SEC filings and public documents (10Ks, 10Qs, 8Ks, and registration statements), lead 
                                                           
17 For each debt issue, I use the most recent 10-K (i.e., filed in the fiscal year before the issue date) to calculate the 
control variables. 
18 This measure of economic inconsistency is based on the textual similarity of the firm’s business description sections 
obtained from 10-K filings.  
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arrangers in loan syndicates as well as other internal sources. The data on Dealscan are organized 
by package and by facility. A package is a financial contract signed between a borrower and a 
lender (or group of lenders) at a particular date. Some packages might involve multiple ‘facilities' 
(e.g., term loans, revolver, a line of credit). Because loan characteristics (e.g., spread, maturity, 
purpose) vary across the facilities, I follow prior literature and treat each facility as a separate 
observation (Bharath et al. 2008; Cheng 2017).19 Moreover, in line with Bharath et al. (2008), I 
retain only term loans, revolvers, and 364-day facilities. Finally, all loans included in the sample 
are senior in terms of the firm’s overall debt structure and have non-missing interest rate spread, 
amount and maturity. 
Data on corporate bonds are obtained from Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database 
(FISD). Following prior studies (Bharath et al. 2008; Florou and Kosi 2015), I exclude convertible 
bonds, bonds with callable features and bonds issued via private placements.20 Furthermore, only 
public bonds with available data on yield spread, amount and maturity are included in the sample. 
I collect financial and accounting data from Compustat-CRSP merged and analysts’ 
forecasts data from IBES. I merge this data with the sample obtained from Dealscan and FISD as 
of the fiscal year ending prior to the issue date of the bank loan or bond. Due to the data availability 
of the accounting inconsistency measure from Peterson et al. (2015), the sample period is from 
1996 through 2013.21 After excluding debt issued by utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial 
                                                           
19 To alleviate concerns related to the inclusion of repetitive observations, I conduct a robustness test using only the 
facility with the largest loan amount in packages with multiple facilities (i.e., package-level sample) (Ivashina 2009). 
The results are presented in Table 10 and are similar to those obtained using the facility-level sample.    
20 In an additional analysis discussed in section 5.2, I use a sample of private placement debt issues (e.g., Rule 144A 
debt issues) to examine the association between accounting inconsistency and the choice between bank debt, non-
bank private debt, and public debt. 
21 Even though the 10-K filings are available in EDGAR from 1994 onwards, the time series measure from Peterson 
et al. (2015) requires two years of data (i.e., year t and year t-1). Thus, it is available since 1995. The consistency 
measure from Peterson et al. (2015) is available through 2012. 
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institutions (SIC 6000-6999), the final sample consists of 8,166 debt issues from 1,950 unique 
firms of which 7,137 are bank loans and 1,029 are public bonds. 
Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main 
analyses. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles.22 Overall, the 
distribution of the variables is consistent with those observed in prior studies (Bharath et al. 2008; 
Cheng 2017; Peterson et al. 2018). Table 1, Panel B, provides summary statistics for firms with 
low accounting inconsistency (i.e., bottom tercile of Acct_Inconsistency) and firms with high 
accounting inconsistency (i.e., top tercile of Acct_Inconsistency). It also reports t-tests for the 
difference in means between the two groups. Consistent with H1, relative to firms with lower 
accounting inconsistency, firms with higher accounting inconsistency are more likely to borrow 
from banks than to issue public bonds as indicated by the positive and statistically significant 
difference in Private. However, several other firm characteristics presented in Panel B, including 
the proxy for economic inconsistency, are also significantly different across the two groups which 
reinforce the importance of including them as covariates in the multivariate tests. 
 
  
                                                           
22 All tables referenced in this study are reported in Appendix B. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Accounting Inconsistency and the Choice Between Bank Loans and Bonds 
Table 2 shows the results for the regression that examines the association between 
accounting inconsistency and firms’ borrowing decisions. Consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms with higher accounting inconsistency are more likely to obtain bank loans than to issue public 
bonds, results reported in Column (1) show that the coefficient on Acct_Inconsistency is positive 
and statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). The marginal effect of 0.17 indicates that a one 
standard deviation increase in Acct_Inconsistency is associated with a 1.0 (0.17*0.06) percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of raising bank debt. Importantly, the economic magnitude of this 
effect is similar to that of other determinants of the source of debt financing. Specifically, a one 
standard deviation decrease in MTB and Tangibility is associated with an increase in the likelihood 
of obtaining a bank loan of 1.3 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively. Similarly, an increase of 
one standard deviation in Default Risk (Leverage) is associated with a 5.1 (2.1) percentage points 
increase in the probability of accessing the private debt market. 
To mitigate the concerns that multiple observations within the same firm-year could 
introduce some bias to the test statistics and drive the results reported in column (1), I follow 
Florou and Kosi (2015) and create a continuous dependent variable (Pct. Privatei,t) that reflects 
the ratio of the amount of bank debt to the amount of total debt (i.e., bank loans plus public bonds) 
issued by firm i in year t.23 The results of this firm-level analysis are presented in column (2). 
Consistent with the debt-issue level analysis reported in column (1), the positive and statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficient on Acct_Inconsistency indicates that accounting 
                                                           
23 Specifically, Pct. Privatei,t is a variable that can take values between zero and one. It equals zero for firms that issues 
only public bonds in a given year, and equals one for firms that only raises bank debt in a given year. Because the 
variable is double-censored (i.e., lower bound of 0 and upper bound of 1), I re-estimate this regression using a Tobit 
model and tabulate the result in Table 10. The results remain unchanged using this alternative estimator.  
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inconsistency is positively associated with the amount of debt obtained from the private debt 
market. 
4.2. Discretionary Inconsistency, Standard-level Inconsistency and the Source of Debt 
Accounting inconsistency captures differences in the firm’s significant accounting policies 
from one year to the next. Firms implement accounting policy changes for two main reasons. First, 
the FASB regularly issues codification updates that require firms to change their accounting 
policies. To the extent that these changes are driven by standard-setters and affect a wide range of 
public firms, they are classified as standard-level changes. Second, given that the continued use of 
the same accounting policy might be sub-optimal when there is a change in the underlying 
circumstances, standard setters confer managers with some level of discretion with respect to the 
accounting policy choice. Specifically, managers can switch from one acceptable policy to another 
as long as the new one is preferable under the current circumstances. Because these changes are a 
product of managerial discretion, they are classified as discretionary accounting changes. 
Since information frictions associated with accounting inconsistency are expected to differ 
according to the type of accounting policy change, I examine whether the effect of accounting 
inconsistency on firms’ borrowing decisions varies between standard-level and discretionary 
accounting changes. To do that, I follow Peterson et al. (2018) and disaggregate the accounting 
inconsistency measure into two components by regressing Acct_Inconsistency on industry-year 
fixed effects (i.e., interactions between indicator variables for each two-digit SIC group and year 
in the sample). The measure of standard-level changes (Stnd_Inconsistency) is the portion of 
Acct_Inconsistency explained by specific industry and year factors (i.e., predicted values), while 
the proxy for discretionary accounting policy changes (Disc_Inconsistency) is defined as the 
unexplained portion (i.e., residuals) of Acct_Inconsistency. 
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Importantly, this disaggregation relies on the assumption that updates to the accounting 
standards are issued to target specific industries (or groups of industries) and, in the case of updates 
related to general transactions, that they promote more changes in certain industries relative to the 
others. Related to the former, several ASUs issued by the FASB are in fact industry-specific. 
Examples include ASU 2009-14, Software: Certain Revenue Arrangements That Include Software 
Elements; ASU 2010-26, Entertainment—Casinos: Accruals for Casino Jackpot Liabilities; and 
ASU 2012-07,  Entertainment—Films: Accounting for Fair Value Information That Arises after 
the Measurement Date and Its Inclusion in the Impairment Analysis of Unamortized Film Costs. 
Moreover, anecdotal evidence from practitioners suggests that some industries are indeed more 
impacted by ASUs related to broader issues. For example, firms operating in aerospace and 
defense, automotive, telecommunications, media and entertainment, engineering and construction, 
pharmaceuticals, and technology industries are expected to implement more changes following 
ASU 2014-09: Revenue from Contracts with Customers (PwC 2018), while retailers, wholesalers, 
and distributors are likely to be more affected by ASU 2016-02, Leases (Deloitte 2018). 
Collectively, these facts help to alleviate concerns related to the plausibility of this assumption. 
 Table 3 reports the results using the more granular measures of accounting inconsistency. 
Column (1) presents the results of the issue-level analysis and column (2) presents the results of 
the firm-level analysis. In both models, the coefficient on Disc_Inconsistency is positive and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05), while the coefficients on Stnd_Inconsistency are not 
significant at the conventional levels. These findings are consistent with the view that accounting 
changes resulting from managerial discretion affects the information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders and thus impact the firms’ borrowing decision.  
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4.3. Cross-sectional Tests: Effects of Accounting Inconsistency Across Firms 
Regulators and standard setters argue that the benefits of accounting consistency arise from 
both the consistent implementation of accounting policies within-firm over time, and from the 
extent to which a firm adopts accounting policies that are similar to those observed in its peers 
(i.e., financial statement comparability). Specifically, the FASB states that “information about a 
reporting entity is more useful if it can be compared with similar information about other entities” 
(FASB 2010). Consistent with that, a large body of empirical work document benefits associated 
with financial statement comparability across firms (De Franco et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2013; 
Peterson et al. 2015; Choi et al. 2019). 
Prior research shows that comparability benefits debt market participants because it 
facilitates the assessment of credit risk. Specifically, Kim et al. (2013) find that comparability 
reduces information asymmetry among bond traders, and Hoitash, Hoitash, Kurt and Verdi (2018) 
suggest that balance sheet comparability is particularly useful for credit risk analysis. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that financial statement comparability affects the information 
processing of debt market participants. Therefore, I examine whether the association between 
accounting inconsistency and firms’ borrowing decisions varies with the level of comparability. 
To conduct this test, I use the cross-sectional measure from Peterson et al. (2015) to proxy 
for the extent to which firms’ accounting policies are consistent with those implemented by their 
industry peers.24 Ind_Acct_Inconsistency equals one minus their measure of cross-sectional 
accounting consistency, so firms with accounting policies that are less consistent with those from 
their peers have higher values of Ind_Acct_Inconsistency. Next, I split the main sample of debt 
issues into firms with high cross-sectional accounting inconsistency (i.e., top tercile of the 
                                                           
24 For more details on the construction of the cross-sectional measure of accounting consistency, please see Peterson 
et al. (2015, p. 2490). 
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distribution of Ind_Acct_Inconsistency in their industry-year) and issues with low 
Ind_Acct_Inconsistency (i.e., bottom tercile). In this analysis, I include the level of cross-sectional 
accounting inconsistency as well as the level of cross-sectional economic inconsistency (i.e., 
economic dissimilarity) as additional control variables.   
Table 4 reports the results from estimating the relation between accounting inconsistency 
and the choice of debt source. Results from columns (1) and (2) indicate that the positive 
association between accounting inconsistency and the likelihood of obtaining bank loans is 
statistically significant only for firms with high cross-sectional accounting inconsistency (i.e., 
lower comparability). Moreover, the χ2-statistic (p-value < 0.05) indicates a statistically significant 
difference in the coefficients of Acct_Inconsistency across the two groups. Finally, the results 
presented in columns (3) and (4) show that discretionary accounting policy changes within firms 
with high cross-sectional accounting inconsistency explain the previous finding. 
While the previous analysis indicates that the effect of accounting inconsistency on the 
choice of borrowing from banks rather than issuing public debt varies depending on the level of 
cross-sectional accounting inconsistency, it does not capture the direction of the accounting policy 
changes adopted by the firm. That is, higher values of accounting inconsistency could be explained 
by accounting changes that result in a set of accounting policies more consistent with those adopted 
by peer firms (i.e., “converging” changes), but it could also reflect managerial choices that produce 
a set of financial statements that are less comparable to those from firms operating in the same 
industry (i.e., “diverging” changes). To the extent that diverging and converging changes are 
expected have a differential effect on the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, 
I also examine whether the association between accounting inconsistency and the choice to borrow 
from banks instead of issuing public debt varies across these types of changes.  
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To conduct this test, I split the sample of debt issues into two groups. I assign firms to the 
“Converge” group if they move from the top tercile of the distribution of Ind_Acct_Inconsistency 
in year t-2 to the bottom tercile of Ind_Acct_Inconsistency in year t-1 (i.e., if their significant 
accounting policies become less inconsistent with those from their peers). Similarly, I assign firms 
to the “Diverge” group if they move from the bottom tercile of the distribution of 
Ind_Acct_Inconsistency in year t-2 to the top tercile of Ind_Acct_Inconsistency in year t-1 (i.e., if 
their significant accounting policies become more inconsistent with those from their peers).  
Table 5 presents the results for this test. Results from columns (1) and (2) show that the 
positive association between accounting inconsistency and the likelihood of obtaining bank loans 
is driven by firms diverging from their industry peers. Moreover, the χ2-statistic (p-value < 0.10) 
indicates a statistically significant difference in the coefficients of Acct_Inconsistency across the 
two groups. The coefficient on Disc_Inconsistency reported in column (3) is positive and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) which indicates that firms diverging from their peers due 
to the adoption of discretionary accounting policy changes are more likely to rely on private debt 
financing. Finally, the coefficient on Stnd_Inconsistency reported in column (4) is negative and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). This finding is consistent with the view that the 
implementation of standard-level changes that leads firms to converge to the accounting policies 
used by their peers reduces the information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders which 
facilitates arm’s length lending (i.e., public debt). 
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4.4. Accounting Inconsistency and Information Frictions 
The results discussed above are consistent with the conjecture that that accounting 
inconsistency reduces the usefulness of public information disclosed by firms (e.g., financial 
statements) which undermines potential lenders’ ability to accurately estimate future cash flows, 
thus imposing higher adverse selection costs for those borrowers. As a result, because financial 
intermediaries (e.g., banks) are better at mitigating the information frictions associated with 
accounting policy changes, firms with higher accounting inconsistency prefer to access the private 
debt market as opposed to the public debt market. In this section, I conduct two analyses to directly 
test this channel. 
4.4.1.  Accounting Inconsistency and Disagreement Between Credit Rating Agencies 
Credit rating agencies use primarily accounting-based information obtained from the 
financial statements to assign credit ratings (Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay 
1998). Prior research shows that differences of opinions among bond raters reflects higher 
information asymmetry between issuers and investors, and captures uncertainty about the 
distribution of borrowers’ future cash flows  (Morgan 2002; Bonsall and Miller 2017). Therefore, 
I test whether accounting policy changes are related to increased information frictions between 
borrowers and lenders by examining the association between accounting inconsistency and bond 
rating disagreement.25 
I obtain credit ratings issued by Moody’s and S&P from FISD. Importantly, I keep only 
the initial credit ratings (i.e., those available at the bond issue date) to ensure that both agencies 
have access to a similar set of information about the borrower. Next, I transform the letter ratings 
                                                           
25 Note that, unlike public lenders (e.g., bondholders), credit rating agencies are exempt from disclosure restrictions 
under Regulation FD. That is, similar to financial intermediaries (e.g., banks), they have access to material private 
information. Therefore, informational asymmetries between issuers and credit rating agencies represent a lower bound 
of the expected level of information asymmetry between issuers and potential public lenders. 
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from both agencies into a single numeric scale in which higher numbers represent worse letter 
ratings (e.g., Aaa = AAA = 1, Aa1 = AA+ = 2, ..., C = D = 21). Following Morgan (2002), I create 
an indicator variable (Split) and set it equal to one if the numeric rating from Moody’s is different 
from the numeric rating from S&P, and zero otherwise. I also take the absolute difference between 
the two numeric ratings (Magnitude) to measure the magnitude of the bond rating disagreement. I 
follow Bonsall and Miller (2017) and control for several firm- and issue-specific characteristics. 
Table 6 reports the results for this analysis. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable 
is Split, and in columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is Magnitude. Overall, the results show 
that the coefficient on Acct_Inconsistency (Disc_Inconsistency) is positive and statistically 
significant (p-values < 0.01). Taken together, these findings are consistent with the conjecture that 
accounting inconsistency is associated with information frictions that increase the information 
asymmetry between borrowers and capital providers. 
4.4.2. Accounting Inconsistency and Syndicated Loans 
A syndicated loan is a loan in which a group of lenders collectively provide funds to a 
single borrower. The process starts with the borrower defining a “lead arranger” who negotiates 
some contract terms and guarantees a loan amount given a certain price range. Next, the lead 
arranger market the deal to potential lenders who might be interested in funding part of the loan. 
Those lenders who join the syndicate are called “participant lenders”. 
Prior research shows that information asymmetry affects the loan syndicate structure as 
well as the syndication process (Sufi 2007; Ivashina and Sun 2011). Therefore, to test the 
conjecture that the inconsistent application of accounting policies impacts the information 
processing of debt market participants, I examine whether accounting inconsistency is associated 
with certain contracting features of syndicated loans. Specifically, because participant lenders 
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possess less information about the borrowers relative to lead arrangers, I follow Fang, Li, Xin, and 
Zhang (2016) and investigate the relation between accounting inconsistency and two 
characteristics of syndicated loans that are likely to be associated with the level of information 
asymmetry within the group of lenders: (i) loan syndication duration (Duration) (i.e., the length of 
time between the launch date and the date in which the funds become available to the borrower); 
and (ii) the number of participants in the syndicate (# of Participants). Moreover, Bharath, Dahiya, 
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007) show that borrowers with higher information asymmetries are 
more likely to obtain loans from relationship lenders (i.e., banks with which they have prior 
relationships). Therefore, I also test whether firms with higher accounting inconsistency are more 
likely to rely on relationship lending (Relationship). 
Table 7 reports the results for these tests. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the 
specification using Duration as the dependent variable. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficients on Acct_Inconsistency and Disc_Inconsistency (p-values < 0.05) indicate that the 
duration of the loan syndication process is longer for firms with higher accounting inconsistency. 
Columns (3) and (4) present the results for the specification using # of Participants as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient on Disc_Inconsistency is negative and statistically significant 
(p-value < 0.05), which suggests that loan syndicates for borrowers with more discretionary 
accounting changes attract fewer participants. Columns (5) and (6) present the results for the 
specification using Relationship as the dependent variable. The positive and statistically significant 
(p-value < 0.05) coefficient on Disc_Inconsistency suggests that firms with higher discretionary 
accounting inconsistency are more likely to rely on relationship lending. Overall, these findings 
are consistent with the conjecture that accounting inconsistency, especially the portion explained 
by discretionary accounting changes, is associated with greater information asymmetry. 
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5. Additional Analyses 
5.1. Debt Contract Terms: Cost of Debt and Amount of Debt 
In this section, I examine the association between accounting inconsistency and debt 
contract terms. Specifically, I investigate whether lenders adjust their credit terms (i.e., cost and 
amount of debt) as a response to the inconsistent implementation of accounting policies. Because 
the choice between issuing private or public debt is not random (e.g., the results reported above 
indicate that accounting inconsistency affects this choice), I examine the relation between 
accounting inconsistency and debt contract terms using an endogenous switching model.26  
In the first stage, the model estimates the firms’ choice between issuing private and public 
debt. In the second stage, the model estimates the relation between the covariates and the cost of 
debt (amount of debt). To mitigate concerns related to the reliability of the estimates, I follow 
Bharath et al. (2008) and use Capital Market Access as the exogenous variable in the first stage, 
and include characteristics of the debt contract (e.g., Maturity, Amount) as covariates unique to the 
second stage. 
Table 8 reports the results for this analysis.27 Columns (1) – (4) present the results for the 
models using Spread as the dependent variable. Columns (5) – (8) present the results for the models 
using Amount as the dependent variable. Overall, the results suggest that firms with higher 
accounting inconsistency obtain higher spreads and a lower amount of debt in the public debt 
market while they get a lower amount from the private debt market. Furthermore, the χ2-statistics 
indicates a statistically significant difference in the coefficients of Acct_Inconsistency 
(Disc_Inconsistency) across the two debt markets in terms of Spread, but the same tests suggest 
                                                           
26 Another benefit of this model is that it allows a direct comparison of coefficient estimates to examine whether the 
effect of accounting inconsistency varies across the two debt markets. 
27 For the sake of brevity, I tabulate only the results from the second stage models. The results from the first stage 
models are similar to those presented in Tables (3) and (4), Column (1). 
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no difference in Amount across the markets. To the extent that firms with higher accounting 
inconsistency are more likely to rely on banks with which they have prior relationships (Table 7, 
Columns (5) and (6)), these findings are consistent with those from Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
which show that lenders “appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices” (p. 3) in 
relationship lending.   
5.2. The Choice Between Bank Debt, Non-Bank Debt, and Public Debt 
Private placement is an alternative form of private debt financing available to firms. This 
market is composed of traditional private placements and debt securities issued under SEC Rule 
144A. Because ownership of non-bank private debt is more concentrated than public debt, private 
placements offer higher monitoring incentives, lower covenant restrictions and greater flexibility 
of renegotiation in case of default (Kwan and Carleton 1995; Dennis and Mihov 2003). Prior 
research finds that firms issue non-bank private debt to avoid constraints associated with flotation 
costs and information asymmetry in the public debt market (Arena 2011). Therefore, I investigate 
whether firms with higher accounting inconsistency are also more likely to issue non-bank private 
debt than public debt. 
For this analysis, I collect a sample of 612 private placements (e.g., debt issues under Rule 
144A and other private debt placements) obtained from FISD and add it to the main sample of 
bank loans and public bonds. Next, I estimate a multinomial logit model to examine the likelihood 
of choosing non-bank private debt over public debt and bank debt over public debt (i.e., public 
debt is the reference group). The covariates used in this model are similar to those used in the main 
analysis. To facilitate the interpretation of results, I standardize all variables to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one and report relative risk ratios.28 
                                                           
28 A relative risk ratio above (below) one indicates that the likelihood of the outcome increases (decreases) as the 
variable increases. 
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Table 9 reports the results for this test. Overall, the results suggest that firms with higher 
accounting inconsistency prefer bank and non-bank private debt over public debt. Specifically, the 
findings reported in column (1) (2) indicate that firms with a one standard deviation increase in 
accounting inconsistency are 1.113 (1.136) times more likely to issue non-bank (bank) private debt 
over public debt. Similarly, results from column (3) (4) suggest that firms with a one standard 
deviation increase in discretionary accounting inconsistency are 1.127 (1.177) times more likely 
to issue non-bank (bank) private debt over public debt. 
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6. Robustness Tests 
In this section, I run several tests to assess the robustness of the results presented above. In 
the first group of analyses reported in Table 10, I examine the sensitivity of my results to alternative 
units of observations and estimation techniques. Specifically, to mitigate the concern that the 
inclusion of repetitive bank loan observations is driving my results, I conduct a robustness test 
using a sample with only one facility per loan package (i.e., package-level sample). Following 
Ivashina (2009), I keep only the facility with the largest loan amount in packages with multiple 
facilities. The results in column (1) (2) show that the association between accounting inconsistency 
(discretionary accounting inconsistency) and the likelihood to borrow privately is also positive and 
statistically significant in this alternative sample. Furthermore, because Pct. Private is a double-
censored variable (i.e., lower bound of 0 and upper bound of 1), I follow Florou and Kosi (2015) 
and re-estimate the firm-level analysis using the Tobit estimator. The results in columns (3) and 
(4) show that my findings are not sensitive to the use of this alternative estimator. Finally, in 
columns (5) and (6) I show that the results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects which 
control for unobservable time-invariant firm-level characteristics. 
As noted above, in the main models I include several control variables that have been 
shown in prior literature to be associated with both firms’ borrowing decisions and accounting 
inconsistency (Bharath et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Peterson et al. 2015). In the next set of 
tests, I investigate whether my results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables 
related to changes in the underlying business (Sales Growth, # of Business Segments, and # of 
Geographic Segments), the quality of firms’ existing information environment (Bid-Ask Spread, 
Stock Liquidity, and Stock Volatility), financial statement complexity (Bog Index, and Gunning 
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Fog Index), and audit quality (Big4, Auditor Change, and ICMW).29 Overall, the results in Table 
11 show that my findings remain unchanged across all alternative model specifications.30 
A potential concern is that firms with higher accounting inconsistency might not have the 
ability to access both debt markets (i.e., private and public).31 I directly test this possibility by re-
estimating the main models using two alternative samples: (i) only firms that have a long-term 
credit rating (i.e., Rating = 1); and (ii) only investment-grade firms (i.e., Investment Grade = 1) 
because prior studies suggest that firms that do not have a debt rating are not able to access the 
public debt market (Faulkender and Petersen 2006). Results from Table 12 show that my 
inferences are robust to the use of these two alternative samples. Therefore, these findings help to 
alleviate the concern that the positive association between accounting inconsistency and the 
likelihood of obtaining bank debt is driven by the lack of access to the public debt market. 
To further assess the robustness of my findings, I consider an alternative measure of 
accounting inconsistency. Wang (2018) develops a proxy for accounting consistency based on the 
stability of the accounting function (i.e., the system that managers use to map economic events to 
financial statements). I follow Wang (2018) and construct an output-based measure of accounting 
inconsistency using the difference between actual and predicted earnings calculated by applying 
the prior years’ accounting function to the current year’s economic events.32 In untabulated tests, 
                                                           
29 Because my variable of interest (Acct_Inconsistency) captures changes in the significant accounting policies 
disclosed in the footnotes of 10-K filings, I assess whether my inferences are robust to the inclusion of changes in the 
control variables that are also based on the text in the 10-K filings. Accordingly, in untabulated tests, I re-estimate the 
models using changes (as opposed to levels) in 10K Length, Bog Index, and Gunning Fog Index, and I find that my 
inferences are robust to this alternative model specification. 
30 To alleviate potential concerns related to multicollinearity, in untabulated tests, I re-estimate the models reported in 
Table 11 with each additional covariate included in a separate regression. My findings remain unchanged under these 
alternative model specifications.  
31 Importantly, in all of my models, I control for whether the firm had issued public debt in previous years (Capital 
Market Access). 
32 Because I am interested in examining the effects of accounting inconsistency, I multiply the accounting consistency 
measure from Wang (2018) by -1 so that higher values indicate more changes in the firm’s accounting policies. 
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Regulators and standard setters hold that accounting consistency is an important attribute 
of financial reporting because it enhances the usefulness of the financial statements. Consistent 
with that view, recent studies find evidence that accounting inconsistency is associated with higher 
information asymmetry and impacts the information processing of equity market participants. 
Prior research shows that financial intermediaries (e.g., banks) are better able to deal with 
information asymmetry than arms’ length lenders (e.g., bondholders), suggesting that borrowers 
with poor information environment face lower adverse selection costs in the private debt market 
relative to the public debt market. Therefore, I posit that firms with higher accounting 
inconsistency are more likely to issue private debt (i.e., bank loans) than public debt (i.e., bonds). 
I find a positive and statistically significant association between accounting inconsistency 
and the likelihood that a firm chooses to raise bank debt. Furthermore, I provide evidence that this 
association is driven by discretionary accounting changes as opposed to changes associated with 
new accounting standards. Because prior studies suggest that the level of accounting consistency 
across firms operating in the same industry (i.e., financial statement comparability) affects 
information processing of debt market participants, I also examine the extent to which cross-
sectional accounting inconsistency affects the relation between accounting inconsistency and the 
choice of debt. I demonstrate that this association is concentrated among firms adopting accounting 
policies that are less consistent with those implemented by their industry peers. 
  Consistent with the view that accounting policy changes increase the information 
asymmetry between borrowers and potential lenders, I find that higher accounting inconsistency 
impacts disagreement among credit rating agencies. Moreover, I provide evidence that the 
inconsistent implementation of accounting policies affects the loan syndication process and the 
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reliance on relationship lending. Finally, I show that accounting inconsistency also impacts ex-
ante debt contract terms. Specifically, firms with higher accounting inconsistency pay a higher 
cost of debt in the public debt market and face credit rationing in both private and public debt 
markets. 
Collectively, my results suggest that changes in accounting policies impact debt 
contracting and provide evidence that private lenders are better able to mitigate information 
frictions arising from accounting inconsistency than public lenders. Therefore, this study 
contributes to the literature on the importance of accounting characteristics for debt contracting 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Description Source 




Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm 
obtains a bank loan in year t, and zero if the firm 




Pct. Private The total amount of bank loans obtained by the 
firm in year t divided by the total amount of debt 
(i.e., bank loans plus public bonds) issued by the 
firm in year t 
Dealscan / 
FISD 




One minus the time-series accounting 
consistency measure developed by Peterson et 
al. (2015) which captures the textual similarity 
of the firm’s current and prior year’s accounting 
policy disclosures (i.e., significant accounting 
policies footnotes disclosed in 10-K filings) 
 
Peterson et al. 
(2015) 
Disc_Inconsistency Residuals obtained from the regression of 
Acct_Inconsistency on industry-year interactions 
 
Peterson et al. 
(2015) 
Stnd_Inconsistency Predicted values from the regression of 
Acct_Inconsistency on industry-year interactions 
 









Control Variables (Main Analyses) 
 
# of Analysts Natural logarithm of one plus the number of 




10K Length Natural logarithm of the number of words 








Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm 




Capital Market Access Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm 
issued a public bond in the past, and zero 
otherwise. Calculated using the entire history of 
public debt issues available on FISD 
FISD 
   
Default Risk 
 
The first principal component of three proxies 
for default risk: Z-Score, Rating, and Investment 
Grade (Dhaliwal et al. 2011) 
 
Compustat 
Disc_Accruals  The absolute value of the residuals from the 





One minus the time-series economic (business) 
consistency measure developed by Peterson et 
al. (2015) which captures the textual similarity 
of the firm’s current and prior year’s business 
description disclosures (i.e., Item 1 or Item 1A 
of the 10-K filing) 
 
Peterson et al. 
(2015) 
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Ind_Acct_Inconsistency One minus the cross-sectional accounting 
consistency measure from Peterson et al. (2015) 
 
Peterson et al. 
(2015) 
Ind_Econ_Inconsistency One minus the cross-sectional economic 
(business) inconsistency measure from Peterson 
et al. (2015) 
 
Peterson et al. 
(2015) 
Investment Grade  Indicator variable set equal to one if the S&P 
credit rating for the firm is investment grade 





Short-term debt (DLC) plus long-term debt 





The market value of equity (PRCC*CSHO) 
divided by book value of equity 
 
Compustat 
Rating Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm has 
a credit rating from S&P, and zero otherwise 
 
Compustat 
Size  Natural logarithm of total assets (AT) 
 
Compustat 
Tangibility  Total net property, plant, and equipment 
















# of Business Segments 
 
Natural logarithm of the firm’s number of 
business segments  
 
Compustat 
# of Geographic Segments 
 
Natural logarithm of the firm’s number of 
geographic segments  
 
Compustat 
# of Leads Natural logarithm of the number of lead 
arrangers in the syndicated loan 
 
Dealscan 
# of Participants Natural logarithm of the number of participants 
in the syndicated loan 
 
Dealscan 





Auditor Change Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm 





Big4 Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is 




Duration Natural logarithm of the number of days 
between the loan syndicate’s launch date and 




Institutional Loan Indicator variable set equal to one if the terms 
“Term Loan B”, “Term Loan C”, or “Term Loan 






The absolute value of the difference in the 




Maturity Natural logarithm of the maturity (in months) 




Relationship  The number of loans associated with the lead 
arranger in the prior five years divided by the 
total number of loans obtained by the firm in the 
same period. Following Bharath et al. (2011), I 
use the maximum value in case there are 





Indicator variable set equal to one if any of the 
lead arrangers is involved in at least one other 
bank loan obtained by the firm in the prior five 
years, and zero otherwise 
 
Dealscan 
Revolver Loan Indicator variable set equal to one if the term 
“Revolver” is included in the loan type 
description, and zero otherwise 
 
Dealscan 
Secured Loan Indicator variable set equal to one if the loan is 




Split  Indicator variable set equal to one if Moody’s 
credit rating for the bond issue is not equal to 
that from S&P, and zero otherwise 
 
FISD 
Spread  For bank loans, it is the natural logarithm of the 
all-in-drawn spread over LIBOR. For bonds, it 
is the natural logarithm of the interest spread 





Stock Volatility The standard deviation of stock daily returns 
measured over the fiscal year 
CRSP 









Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
Variable N Mean STD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
Private 8,166 0.874 0.332 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Acct_Inconsistency 8,166 0.126 0.061 0.051 0.080 0.119 0.164 0.208 
Disc_Inconsistency 8,166 -0.002 0.054 -0.067 -0.039 -0.007 0.030 0.070 
Stnd_Inconsistency 8,166 0.127 0.027 0.090 0.112 0.130 0.145 0.160 
Econ_Inconsistency 8,166 0.123 0.084 0.040 0.064 0.102 0.159 0.235 
Size 8,166 7.148 1.832 4.705 5.845 7.163 8.467 9.542 
MTB 8,166 3.083 3.158 0.938 1.401 2.168 3.460 5.774 
Default Risk 8,166 0.017 1.275 -1.753 -1.519 -0.246 1.180 1.388 
Tangibility 8,166 0.286 0.229 0.057 0.113 0.210 0.406 0.654 
Leverage 8,166 0.217 0.166 0.001 0.086 0.199 0.326 0.456 
Disc_Accruals 8,166 0.039 0.039 0.005 0.012 0.026 0.051 0.093 
Capital Markets Access 8,166 0.537 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Acquisition 8,166 0.533 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
# of Analysts 8,166 1.945 0.943 0.693 1.386 2.079 2.708 3.091 
10K Length 8,166 10.380 0.519 9.681 10.061 10.436 10.708 10.981 
 
Panel B: Comparison of Means - High Acct_Inconsistency vs Low Acct_Inconsistency 
  Low   High   High - Low 
  n = 2,724   n = 2,723   t-test 
Private 0.829   0.916   9.612*** 
Econ_Inconsistency 0.104   0.144   17.340*** 
Size 7.469   6.745   -14.831*** 
MTB 3.057   3.161   1.202 
Default Risk -0.106   0.154   7.513*** 
Tangibility 0.289   0.281   -1.243 
Leverage 0.218   0.219   0.104 
Disc_Accruals 0.035   0.045   9.333*** 
Capital Markets Access 0.587   0.474   -8.428*** 
Acquisition 0.543   0.529   -1.045 
# of Analysts 2.075   1.769   -12.025*** 
10K Length 10.419   10.315   -7.272*** 
 
Notes: Panel A presents summary statistics for the variables used in the main tests and Panel B presents sample 
means for the subsamples of observations with low (i.e., bottom tercile of Acct_Inconsistency) and high accounting 
inconsistency (i.e., top tercile of Acct_Inconsistency). All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 





Accounting Inconsistency and the Choice Between Private and Public Debt 
 
  (1) (2) 
  Private Pct. Private 
Acct_Inconsistency 0.170** 0.152** 
  (2.228) (2.221) 
Econ_Inconsistency 0.058 -0.002 
  (1.140) (-0.041) 
Size -0.048*** -0.038*** 
  (-9.682) (-6.407) 
MTB -0.004*** -0.003** 
  (-3.136) (-2.168) 
Default Risk 0.040*** 0.044*** 
  (7.101) (7.921) 
Tangibility -0.079*** -0.033 
  (-2.677) (-1.018) 
Leverage 0.128*** 0.054* 
  (4.141) (1.821) 
Capital Markets Access -0.014*** -0.032*** 
  (-2.784) (-2.930) 
Disc_Accruals 0.172 -0.076 
  (1.414) (-0.835) 
Acquisition -0.005 0.012 
  (-0.592) (1.338) 
# of Analysts -0.023*** 0.007 
  (-2.698) (1.123) 
10K Length 0.001 0.007 
  (0.124) (0.615) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 7,919 5,137 
Pseudo R2 0.395   
Adj. R2   0.221 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of a Probit (OLS) model with Private (Pct. Private) as the dependent variable. 
The sample period is from 1996 through 2013. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Column (1) presents average marginal effects (AMEs), and the 
respective Z-statistics in parentheses. Column (2) presents estimates coefficients and the respective t-statistics in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 3 
Disaggregated Accounting Inconsistency and the Choice Between Private and Public Debt 
 
  (1) (2) 
  Private Pct. Private 
Disc_Inconsistency 0.170** 0.148** 
  (2.198) (2.139) 
Stnd_Inconsistency 0.170 0.291 
  (0.411) (0.750) 
Econ_Inconsistency 0.058 -0.002 
  (1.139) (-0.038) 
Size -0.048*** -0.038*** 
  (-9.681) (-6.413) 
MTB -0.004*** -0.003** 
  (-3.137) (-2.172) 
Default Risk 0.040*** 0.044*** 
  (7.101) (7.895) 
Tangibility -0.079*** -0.033 
  (-2.682) (-1.022) 
Leverage 0.128*** 0.054* 
  (4.148) (1.829) 
Capital Markets Access -0.014*** -0.032*** 
  (-2.784) (-2.935) 
Disc_Accruals 0.172 -0.077 
  (1.419) (-0.847) 
Acquisition -0.005 0.012 
  (-0.591) (1.344) 
# of Analysts -0.023*** 0.008 
  (-2.699) (1.129) 
10K Length 0.001 0.007 
  (0.124) (0.617) 
      
Observations 7,919 5,137 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.395   
Adj. R2   0.220 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of a Probit (OLS) model with Private (Pct. Private) as the dependent variable. 
The sample period is from 1996 through 2013. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Column (1) presents average marginal effects (AMEs), and the 
respective Z-statistics in parentheses. Column (2) presents estimates coefficients and the respective t-statistics in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4 
Cross-Sectional Analysis: High vs Low Ind_Acct_Inconsistency 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Private Private Private Private 
  High Low High Low 
Acct_Inconsistency 0.434*** 0.005     
  (3.243) (0.041)     
Disc_Inconsistency     0.462*** 0.005 
      (3.409) (0.039) 
Stnd_Inconsistency     -0.599 0.049 
      (-0.618) (0.079) 
Econ_Inconsistency 0.000 0.033 -0.002 0.033 
  (0.001) (0.465) (-0.016) (0.464) 
Ind_Acct_Inconsistency 0.785*** -1.055* 0.803*** -1.055* 
  (2.850) (-1.801) (2.851) (-1.802) 
Ind_Econ_Inconsistency -0.115 0.368 -0.136 0.368 
  (-0.436) (1.499) (-0.525) (1.498) 
Size -0.052*** -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.044*** 
  (-5.647) (-5.528) (-5.684) (-5.527) 
MTB -0.004* -0.004** -0.004* -0.004* 
  (-1.807) (-1.966) (-1.833) (-1.941) 
Default Risk 0.051*** 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.037*** 
  (4.236) (4.547) (4.263) (4.544) 
Tangibility -0.101 -0.053 -0.095 -0.053 
  (-1.601) (-0.995) (-1.507) (-1.002) 
Leverage 0.150** 0.128** 0.145** 0.128** 
  (2.359) (2.371) (2.304) (2.373) 
Capital Markets Access -0.016 -0.036* -0.014 -0.035* 
  (-0.676) (-1.909) (-0.596) (-1.912) 
Disc_Accruals 0.107 0.140 0.120 0.140 
  (0.440) (0.869) (0.498) (0.870) 
Acquisition -0.022 0.010 -0.022 0.011 
  (-1.338) (0.739) (-1.334) (0.744) 
# of Analysts -0.030 -0.011 -0.030 -0.011 
  (-1.574) (-0.901) (-1.539) (-0.895) 
10K Length -0.001 0.041** -0.000 0.041** 
  (-0.050) (2.383) (-0.007) (2.384) 
H0: Acct_InconsistencyHigh = Acct_InconsistencyLow χ2(1) = 3.98     
  p-value = 0.046     
H0: Disc_InconsistencyHigh = Disc_InconsistencyLow     χ2(1) = 4.41 
      p-value = 0.036 
H0: Stnd_InconsistencyHigh = Stnd_InconsistencyLow     χ2(1) = 0.28 
      p-value = 0.598 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,460 2,503 2,460 2,503 
Pseudo R2 0.416 0.407 0.416 0.407 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of Probit models with Private as the dependent variable. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Columns (1) and (3) present average marginal effects (AMEs), 
and the respective Z-statistics in parentheses for the subsample of observations with high cross-sectional accounting inconsistency (i.e., 
top tercile of Ind_Acct_Inconsistency). Columns (2) and (4) present average marginal effects (AMEs), and the respective Z-statistics in 
parentheses for the subsample of observations with low cross-sectional accounting inconsistency (i.e., bottom tercile of 
Ind_Acct_Inconsistency). Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
 52
Table 5 
Cross-Sectional Analysis: Diverge vs Converge 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Private Private Private Private 
  Diverge Converge Diverge Converge 
Acct_Inconsistency 0.245** -0.089     
  (2.299) (-0.237)     
Disc_Inconsistency     0.261** 0.112 
      (2.483) (0.334) 
Stnd_Inconsistency     -0.354 -3.962** 
      (-0.582) (-2.040) 
Econ_Inconsistency -0.016 0.775*** -0.014 0.777*** 
  (-0.202) (2.803) (-0.178) (3.158) 
Ind_Acct_Inconsistency 0.008 -1.419 0.011 -2.272 
  (0.043) (-0.859) (0.059) (-1.393) 
Ind_Econ_Inconsistency 0.166 -0.286 0.159 -0.607 
  (0.861) (-0.536) (0.830) (-1.154) 
Size -0.050*** -0.078*** -0.050*** -0.082*** 
  (-7.536) (-3.420) (-7.534) (-3.887) 
MTB -0.004*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.019*** 
  (-2.724) (-3.793) (-2.693) (-4.095) 
Default Risk 0.042*** 0.090*** 0.042*** 0.089*** 
  (5.789) (3.456) (5.801) (3.566) 
Tangibility -0.125*** 0.059 -0.122*** 0.104 
  (-3.003) (0.310) (-2.899) (0.588) 
Leverage 0.140*** 0.182 0.137*** 0.180 
  (3.053) (1.054) (3.012) (1.076) 
Capital Markets Access -0.028* 0.009 -0.028 0.013 
  (-1.661) (0.166) (-1.645) (0.234) 
Disc_Accruals 0.228 0.309 0.234 0.693 
  (1.384) (0.544) (1.424) (1.248) 
Acquisition -0.012 0.090** -0.012 0.074** 
  (-0.955) (2.459) (-0.989) (2.138) 
# of Analysts -0.010 -0.086** -0.010 -0.068* 
  (-0.908) (-2.022) (-0.917) (-1.707) 
10K Length 0.014 -0.198*** 0.014 -0.204*** 
  (0.914) (-3.195) (0.921) (-3.398) 
H0: Acct_InconsistencyDiverge = Acct_InconsistencyConverge χ2(1) = 3.09     
  p-value = 0.079     
H0: Disc_InconsistencyDiverge = Disc_InconsistencyConverge     χ2(1) = 2.99 
      p-value = 0.084 
H0: Stnd_InconsistencyDiverge = Stnd_InconsistencyConverge     χ2(1) = 3.00 
      p-value = 0.083 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 352 391 352 391 
Pseudo R2 0.409 0.569 0.410 0.576 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of Probit models with Private as the dependent variable. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Columns (1) and (3) present average marginal effects (AMEs), 
and the respective Z-statistics in parentheses for the subsample of observations that diverge from the accounting policies implemented by 
their peers. Columns (2) and (4) present average marginal effects (AMEs), and the respective Z-statistics in parentheses for the subsample 
of observations that converge to the accounting policies implemented by their peers. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * 




Channel Analysis: Bond Rating Disagreement 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Split Split Magnitude Magnitude 
Acct_Inconsistency 1.443***   1.703***   
  (3.671)   (2.712)   
Disc_Inconsistency   1.730***   1.983*** 
    (4.048)   (2.774) 
Stnd_Inconsistency   -3.646   -2.400 
    (-1.493)   (-0.519) 
Econ_Inconsistency 0.140 0.175 0.260 0.290 
  (0.497) (0.612) (0.471) (0.514) 
Ind_Acct_Inconsistency 0.926 0.840 2.398 2.368 
  (0.776) (0.695) (1.075) (1.046) 
Ind_Econ_Inconsistency 1.434* 1.306* 0.766 0.616 
  (1.876) (1.716) (0.492) (0.399) 
Size -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.092 -0.093 
  (-3.109) (-3.106) (-1.306) (-1.312) 
MTB -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
  (-0.771) (-0.698) (-0.108) (-0.063) 
Default Risk 0.010 0.008 0.073 0.068 
  (0.341) (0.267) (1.029) (0.958) 
Tangibility 0.102 0.044 -0.007 -0.059 
  (0.535) (0.228) (-0.019) (-0.161) 
Leverage 0.130 0.156 0.082 0.098 
  (0.631) (0.759) (0.218) (0.262) 
Capital Markets Access -0.066 -0.085 -0.046 -0.065 
  (-0.630) (-0.779) (-0.280) (-0.385) 
Disc_Accruals 0.445 0.455 1.552 1.609 
  (0.541) (0.558) (1.055) (1.090) 
Acquisition -0.114** -0.113** -0.218** -0.218** 
  (-2.341) (-2.326) (-2.292) (-2.274) 
# of Analysts 0.082* 0.082* 0.092 0.091 
  (1.656) (1.669) (0.938) (0.926) 
10K Length 0.170*** 0.179*** 0.311*** 0.317*** 
  (2.697) (2.851) (2.938) (3.033) 
# of Business Segments -0.012 -0.014 -0.037 -0.037 
  (-0.245) (-0.278) (-0.394) (-0.394) 
# of Geographic Segments 0.043 0.032 0.009 0.001 
  (0.815) (0.622) (0.088) (0.010) 
Amount 0.099** 0.093** 0.139* 0.137* 
  (2.174) (2.063) (1.805) (1.766) 
Maturity -0.027 -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 
  (-1.030) (-1.108) (-0.583) (-0.630) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 689 689 689 689 
Pseudo R2 0.190 0.197     
Adjusted R2     0.142 0.143 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of Probit (OLS) models with Split (Magnitude) as the dependent variable. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Columns (1) and (2) 
present average marginal effects (AMEs), and the respective Z-statistics in parentheses. Columns (3) and (4) present 
coefficient estimates, and the respective t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively based on two-tailed tests.  
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Table 7 
Channel Analysis: Loan Syndication Process and Loan Syndicate Structure 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Duration Duration # Participants # Participants Relationship Relationship 
Acct_Inconsistency 1.358**   0.243   -0.005   
  (2.055)   (0.845)   (-0.040)   
Disc_Inconsistency   1.417**   -0.344**   0.045** 
    (2.122)   (-2.385)   (2.197) 
Stnd_Inconsistency   -2.960   3.193   -1.413 
    (-0.920)   (1.171)   (-0.373) 
Econ_Inconsistency -0.571 -0.498 -0.168 -0.169 0.049 0.051 
  (-1.482) (-1.273) (-0.875) (-0.876) (0.640) (0.663) 
Ind_Acct_Inconsistency -2.670 -2.616 0.006 -0.028 0.198 0.204 
  (-1.637) (-1.611) (0.007) (-0.033) (0.619) (0.638) 
Ind_Econ_Inconsistency 3.781** 3.728** -0.626 -0.672 -0.143 -0.130 
  (2.455) (2.457) (-1.456) (-1.567) (-0.608) (-0.552) 
Size -0.084* -0.076 0.038 0.040 0.018* 0.017* 
  (-1.652) (-1.484) (1.546) (1.609) (1.813) (1.729) 
MTB -0.016* -0.016* 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (-1.876) (-1.927) (0.302) (0.279) (0.193) (0.189) 
Default Risk -0.020 -0.015 -0.026 -0.025 0.001 0.000 
  (-0.436) (-0.320) (-1.395) (-1.359) (0.083) (0.023) 
Tangibility 0.176 0.178 0.271*** 0.278*** 0.007 0.005 
  (0.782) (0.788) (2.648) (2.709) (0.144) (0.105) 
Leverage 0.371* 0.385* -0.147 -0.148 0.075 0.075 
  (1.815) (1.885) (-1.412) (-1.417) (1.536) (1.544) 
Capital Markets Access 0.073 0.070 0.019 0.019 0.002 0.001 
  (1.105) (1.067) (0.438) (0.446) (0.079) (0.073) 
Disc_Accruals -0.361 -0.363 -0.004 0.026 -0.195 -0.206 
  (-0.349) (-0.348) (-0.008) (0.053) (-1.168) (-1.231) 
Acquisition 0.021 0.026 0.058** 0.056* 0.009 0.010 
  (0.291) (0.359) (2.013) (1.958) (0.659) (0.692) 
# of Analysts 0.089** 0.082* 0.091*** 0.090*** -0.007 -0.006 
  (2.006) (1.885) (3.897) (3.857) (-0.554) (-0.480) 
10K Length 0.127 0.129 -0.037 -0.036 0.002 0.002 
  (1.337) (1.354) (-0.800) (-0.784) (0.124) (0.100) 
Amount 0.066** 0.064** 0.354*** 0.354*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
  (2.327) (2.257) (21.331) (21.397) (7.632) (7.630) 
Maturity 0.127 0.131 0.230*** 0.229*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
  (1.508) (1.564) (6.921) (6.925) (-3.803) (-3.804) 
Revolver Loan 0.037 0.036 -0.184*** -0.184*** 0.001 0.002 
  (0.623) (0.611) (-6.267) (-6.241) (0.117) (0.152) 
Institutional Loan -0.239*** -0.239*** -0.530*** -0.532*** 0.024 0.025 
  (-3.195) (-3.198) (-10.046) (-10.077) (1.332) (1.379) 
Secured Loan -0.206** -0.205** 0.025 0.025 0.003 0.003 
  (-2.151) (-2.150) (0.833) (0.832) (0.178) (0.166) 
Relationship Lender 0.059 0.064 0.150*** 0.152***     
  (0.799) (0.859) (5.304) (5.403)     
# of Leads -0.053 -0.059 -0.015 -0.017     
  (-0.776) (-0.862) (-0.329) (-0.370)     
Loan Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 738 738 5,423 5,423 6,811 6,811 
Adjusted R2 0.214 0.215 0.379 0.380 0.149 0.150 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS models with Duration, # of Participants and Relationship as the dependent 
variables. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Columns (1) - (6) present coefficient estimates, and the respective t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively based on two-tailed tests.
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Table 8 
Accounting Inconsistency and Debt Terms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Spread   Amount 
  Loans Bonds Loans Bonds   Loans Bonds Loans Bonds 
Acct_Inconsistency 0.229 1.104**       -1.183*** -0.813**     
  (1.396) (2.319)       (-4.026) (-2.000)     
Disc_Inconsistency     0.228 1.204**       -1.200*** -0.806* 
      (1.376) (2.496)       (-4.014) (-1.937) 
Stnd_Inconsistency     0.297 -0.855       -0.576 -1.004 
      (0.344) (-0.281)       (-0.376) (-0.462) 
Econ_Inconsistency 0.360*** 0.375 0.360*** 0.393   -0.306 0.385* -0.305 0.387* 
  (3.202) (1.239) (3.202) (1.309)   (-1.534) (1.725) (-1.535) (1.724) 
Size -0.087*** -0.517*** -0.087*** -0.520***   0.796*** 0.528*** 0.796*** 0.528*** 
  (-5.861) (-12.469) (-5.870) (-12.623)   (47.895) (19.198) (47.742) (19.259) 
MTB -0.010** -0.025*** -0.010** -0.025***   0.013** 0.004 0.013** 0.004 
  (-2.327) (-2.905) (-2.326) (-2.887)   (2.036) (0.666) (2.040) (0.662) 
Default Risk -0.037*** -0.083*** -0.037*** -0.083***   0.035*** 0.048*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 
  (-7.985) (-4.650) (-7.981) (-4.646)   (4.690) (3.786) (4.696) (3.789) 
Tangibility -0.351*** -0.533* -0.351*** -0.524*   0.284** 0.149 0.284** 0.148 
  (-4.655) (-1.814) (-4.658) (-1.769)   (2.025) (1.059) (2.023) (1.048) 
Leverage 0.586*** 0.237 0.586*** 0.232   -0.143 0.591*** -0.143 0.592*** 
  (8.156) (0.840) (8.151) (0.825)   (-0.951) (2.966) (-0.952) (2.954) 
Disc_Accruals -0.187 0.959* -0.187 0.975*   0.110 -0.043 0.111 -0.042 
  (-1.260) (1.701) (-1.259) (1.747)   (0.455) (-0.088) (0.459) (-0.085) 
Acquisition 0.168*** 0.190* 0.168*** 0.187*   -0.014 -0.260*** -0.014 -0.260*** 
  (6.013) (1.748) (6.020) (1.723)   (-0.275) (-2.869) (-0.269) (-2.862) 
# of Analysts -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008   0.009 0.046** 0.009 0.046** 
  (-0.283) (-0.272) (-0.284) (-0.234)   (0.443) (2.561) (0.442) (2.549) 
10K Length 0.177*** 0.159** 0.177*** 0.158**   -0.075 -0.065 -0.076 -0.065 
  (5.424) (2.318) (5.424) (2.274)   (-1.335) (-1.239) (-1.344) (-1.233) 
Maturity 0.184*** 0.173*** 0.184*** 0.171***   0.243*** 0.028 0.243*** 0.028 
  (9.082) (6.470) (9.087) (6.516)   (7.080) (1.125) (7.097) (1.140) 
Amount -0.186*** 0.150*** -0.186*** 0.150***           
  (-13.415) (4.497) (-13.417) (4.616)           
H0: Acct_InconsistencyLoans = Acct_InconsistencyBonds χ2(1) = 3.18       χ2(1) = 0.65     
  p-value = 0.075       p-value = 0.420     
H0: Disc_InconsistencyLoans = Disc_InconsistencyBonds   χ2(1) = 3.83       χ2(1) = 0.69 
      p-value = 0.050       p-value = 0.407 
H0: Stnd_InconsistencyLoans = Stnd_InconsistencyBonds   χ2(1) = 0.15       χ2(1) = 0.03 
      p-value = 0.703       p-value = 0.858 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,890 1,029 6,890 1,029   6,890 1,029 6,890 1,029 
Wald test of independent equations (p-value) χ2 = 48.81 (p-value < 0.01) χ2 = 50.25 (p-value < 0.01)   χ2 = 138.61 (p-value < 0.01) χ2 = 141.32 (p-value < 0.01) 
Notes: This table presents the results of endogenous switching models with Spread and Amount as the dependent variables. The results for the first stage equations are similar to those presented in 
column (1) of Tables (3) and (4). All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Columns (1) - (8) present coefficient estimates, and 
the respective Z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively based on two-tailed tests.
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Table 9 
Public Debt, Non-Bank Private Debt, and Bank Debt 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 









Acct_Inconsistency 1.113** 1.136**     
  (2.055) (2.299)     
Disc_Inconsistency     1.127** 1.177** 
      (2.001) (2.286) 
Stnd_Inconsistency     1.005 1.091 
      (0.022) (0.524) 
Econ_Inconsistency 1.097 1.097 1.104 1.096 
  (0.987) (1.502) (1.061) (1.488) 
Size 0.498*** 0.306*** 0.498*** 0.306*** 
  (-3.653) (-8.773) (-3.659) (-8.771) 
MTB 0.749*** 0.844*** 0.748*** 0.843*** 
  (-2.960) (-2.788) (-2.968) (-2.794) 
Default Risk 2.439*** 2.151*** 2.443*** 2.154*** 
  (5.536) (6.240) (5.539) (6.249) 
Tangibility 0.890 0.763*** 0.890 0.762*** 
  (-0.818) (-2.864) (-0.825) (-2.894) 
Leverage 1.894*** 1.351*** 1.899*** 1.352*** 
  (6.119) (3.795) (6.159) (3.818) 
Capital Markets Access 1.445** 0.871 1.439** 0.869 
  (2.516) (-1.413) (2.492) (-1.437) 
Disc_Accruals 1.335*** 1.105 1.338*** 1.104 
  (2.737) (1.409) (2.774) (1.410) 
Acquisition 0.875 0.962 0.875 0.963 
  (-1.414) (-0.656) (-1.407) (-0.651) 
# of Analysts 0.702** 0.693*** 0.703** 0.693*** 
  (-2.137) (-3.033) (-2.140) (-3.040) 
10K Length 1.251** 1.005 1.254** 1.004 
  (1.993) (0.064) (2.008) (0.061) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,531 8,531 
Pseudo R2 0.322 0.323 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of a multinomial logit model examining the likelihood that firms issue non-bank private 
debt over public debt (columns (1) and (3)) and bank debt over public debt (columns (2) and (4)). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are standardized (i.e., have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Columns (1) - (4) present relative risk ratios, and the respective z-statistics in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 




Robustness Test: Alternative Estimations 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Private Private Pct. Private Pct. Private Pct. Private Pct. Private 
Acct_Inconsistency 0.175**   1.586**   0.175*   
  (2.000)   (2.176)   (1.920)   
Disc_Inconsistency   0.162*   1.666**   0.178* 
    (1.829)   (2.272)   (1.951) 
Stnd_Inconsistency   0.551   -0.529   0.105 
    (1.129)   (-0.156)   (0.213) 
Econ_Inconsistency 0.076 0.076 -0.465 -0.466 0.028 0.028 
  (1.254) (1.254) (-0.896) (-0.898) (0.382) (0.379) 
Size -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.404*** -0.404*** -0.024 -0.024 
  (-10.664) (-10.704) (-7.690) (-7.686) (-1.511) (-1.463) 
MTB -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.021* -0.021* -0.003 -0.003 
  (-3.251) (-3.272) (-1.714) (-1.692) (-1.416) (-1.398) 
Default Risk 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.338*** 0.338*** 0.021* 0.021* 
  (6.958) (6.947) (6.612) (6.627) (1.816) (1.818) 
Tangibility -0.072** -0.074** -0.623*** -0.629*** -0.074 -0.076 
  (-2.106) (-2.174) (-3.435) (-3.464) (-0.818) (-0.836) 
Leverage 0.109*** 0.110*** -0.358 -0.354 0.063 0.061 
  (3.038) (3.091) (-1.271) (-1.258) (1.094) (1.069) 
Capital Markets Access -0.016 -0.016 -0.606*** -0.604*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
  (-1.079) (-1.101) (-5.016) (-4.997) (2.780) (2.781) 
Disc_Accruals 0.206 0.200 -0.709 -0.687 -0.020 -0.020 
  (1.495) (1.459) (-0.559) (-0.543) (-0.176) (-0.175) 
Acquisition -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (-1.173) (-1.143) (-0.081) (-0.082) (-0.536) (-0.531) 
# of Analysts -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.044 -0.043 0.000 -0.000 
  (-2.638) (-2.627) (-0.649) (-0.638) (0.023) (-0.003) 
10K Length 0.002 0.002 -0.073 -0.071 -0.014 -0.014 
  (0.221) (0.210) (-0.781) (-0.760) (-0.708) (-0.718) 
              
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,879 5,879 5,137 5,137 4,311 4,311 
Pseudo R2 0.406 0.406 0.245 0.244     
Adjusted R2         0.084 0.084 
 
Notes: This table presents some robustness tests. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the Probit model estimated at the debt issue-
level using only one facility per package. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of Tobit models estimated at the firm-year level. 
Columns (5) and (6) report the results of a firm fixed-effects model. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively based on two-tailed tests.
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Table 11 
Robustness Test: Alternative Model Specifications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private 
Acct_Inconsistency 0.157**   0.164**   0.164**   0.217*   
  (2.023)   (2.020)   (2.170)   (1.956)   
Disc_Inconsistency   0.152*   0.163**   0.160**   0.203* 
    (1.949)   (1.985)   (2.097)   (1.829) 
Stnd_Inconsistency   0.314   0.235   0.288   0.911 
    (0.754)   (0.534)   (0.703)   (1.219) 
Sales Growth 0.003 0.003             
  (0.157) (0.157)             
Chg. # of Business Segments 0.004 0.004             
  (0.480) (0.480)             
Chg. # of Geographic Segments -0.006 -0.006             
  (-0.847) (-0.847)             
Bid-Ask Spread     0.581 0.593         
      (0.153) (0.157)         
Stock Liquidity     -0.006 -0.006         
      (-1.050) (-1.059)         
Stock Volatility     0.395 0.391         
      (0.365) (0.362)         
Bog Index         0.002** 0.002**     
          (2.310) (2.299)     
Gunning Fog Index         -0.006 -0.006     
          (-1.226) (-1.222)     
Big4             0.018 0.019 
              (0.592) (0.624) 
Auditor Change             0.046 0.045 
              (1.308) (1.311) 
ICMW             0.039 0.040 
              (0.884) (0.893) 
Standard Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,919 7,919 7,224 7,224 7,774 7,774 4,352 4,352 
Pseudo R2 0.395 0.395 0.388 0.388 0.396 0.396 0.399 0.399 
Notes: This table presents some robustness tests using alternative model specifications including additional control variables. Columns (1) - (8) present average marginal effects 
(AMEs), and the respective Z-statistics in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 12 
Robustness Test: Alternative Samples 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  Rating = 1   Investment Grade = 1 
  Private Private   Private Private 
Acct_Inconsistency 0.255*     0.435**   
  (1.871)     (2.137)   
Disc_Inconsistency   0.243*     0.411** 
    (1.760)     (1.997) 
Stnd_Inconsistency   0.645     1.187 
    (0.883)     (0.934) 
Econ_Inconsistency 0.152 0.152   0.067 0.066 
  (1.629) (1.625)   (0.441) (0.436) 
Size -0.068*** -0.068***   -0.091*** -0.092*** 
  (-7.422) (-7.438)   (-6.359) (-6.379) 
MTB -0.006** -0.006**   -0.002 -0.002 
  (-2.497) (-2.520)   (-0.319) (-0.324) 
Default Risk 0.104*** 0.104***   -0.289** -0.296** 
  (8.412) (8.420)   (-2.282) (-2.330) 
Tangibility -0.148*** -0.150***   -0.273*** -0.276*** 
  (-2.764) (-2.809)   (-2.957) (-3.000) 
Leverage 0.195*** 0.197***   0.044 0.045 
  (3.121) (3.159)   (0.296) (0.297) 
Capital Markets Access -0.037 -0.037   -0.031 -0.033 
  (-1.429) (-1.445)   (-0.612) (-0.644) 
Disc_Accruals 0.335 0.328   0.516 0.503 
  (1.444) (1.422)   (1.276) (1.250) 
Acquisition -0.004 -0.003   -0.015 -0.015 
  (-0.236) (-0.219)   (-0.641) (-0.618) 
# of Analysts -0.033** -0.033**   -0.014 -0.013 
  (-2.205) (-2.185)   (-0.532) (-0.482) 
10K Length -0.004 -0.004   -0.009 -0.009 
  (-0.230) (-0.243)   (-0.315) (-0.338) 
            
Industry FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 4,216 4,216   2,273 2,273 
Pseudo R2 0.275 0.275   0.168 0.168 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of a robustness test using alternative samples of debt issues. Columns (1) and (2) present 
average marginal effects (AMEs), and the respective z-statistics in parentheses for Probit models estimated using a sample of 
debt issues from firms with a credit rating (i.e., Rating = 1). Columns (3) and (4) present average marginal effects (AMEs), and 
the respective z-statistics in parentheses for Probit models estimated using a sample of debt issues from investment-grade firms 
(i.e., Investment Grade = 1). All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 
99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
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